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Privacy and Power 
RosA EHRENREICH* 
Something has gone wrong in modem America, argues Jeffrey Rosen in The 
Unwanted Gaze. Our medical records are bought and sold by health care 
providers, drug companies, and the insurance industry. Our e-mails are inter-
cepted and read by our employers. Amazon.com knows everything there is to 
know about our reading and web-browsing habits. Poor Monica Lewinsky's 
draft love letters to President Bill Clinton were seized by the villainous Ken 
Starr, and ultimately plastered all over the nation's newspapers. 
To Rosen, the nature of the problem is clear: These examples are all part of a 
troubling "phenomenon that affects all Americans: namely, the erosion of 
privacy at home, at work, and in cyberspace, so that intimate personal informa-
tion ... is increasingly vulnerable to being wrenched out of context and ex-
posed to the world." 1 Rosen is, of course, hardly unusual in viewing all these 
issues as quintessential privacy violations. In the past few years the media seem 
to have woken up to privacy issues, and most of us have been sympathetic 
readers of dozens of popular articles addressing just such a range of "privacy 
violations."2 At the moment, the language of privacy seems to be the only 
language we have for talking about issues such as workplace e-mail monitoring, 
electronic cookies, medical records, and Monica's love letters. 
Is this a good thing? Unquestionably, Rosen's examples are troubling, but are 
they all troubling in precisely the same way? Does it make sense to analyze 
them all as solely or primarily examples of the erosion of "privacy"? Moreover, 
is there a coherent and articulate conception of "privacy" that underlies all of 
Rosen's examples? 
There is a jurisprudential tradition-sometimes noble, sometimes not-of 
quarreling over the concept of "privacy."3 I hesitate to join the fray, because I 
* Associate Fellow, Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard 
University, and Consultant to the Open Society Institute and Human Rights Watch. 
· I. JEFFREY RosEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRucnoN OF PRivAcY IN AMERICA 3 (2000). 
2. See, e.g., Maura Dolan, The Right to Know vs. the Right to Privacy, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1997, at 
AI; The End of Privacy, EcoNOMIST, May 1, 1999, at 15, 15-16; Jonathan Gaw, Privacy for Sale, 
MINNEAPOLIS STAR ThiB., July 6, 1997, at Dl; Bob Herbert, A 'Right to Privacy' Still a Pipe Dream in 
Electronic World, DALLAS MoRNING N!iWS, Oct. 4, 1998, at 15. 
3. What, after all, is this thing "privacy"-which, some say, protects rights (or claims of rights, or 
interests, or conditions) relating to everything from abortion to medical records to what we do in the 
bedroom when (we hope) the neighbors are not looking? As Nadine Strossen recently remarked, 
perhaps somewhat ruefully, the right to privacy seems "broad and sweeping ... a capacious unifying 
concept that encompasses all of the various separate facets of ... diverse rights ... that sometimes 
seem quite disparate." Nan Hunter, Nadine Strossen & Jed Rubenfeld, Contemporary Challenges to 
Privacy Rights, 43 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 195, 196 (1999). Scholars have killed trees and sacrificed 
unknown megabytes of disk space on the altar of privacy, attempting to define it, defend it, subdivide it, 
excoriate it, and occasionally even deny it. Privacy has been variously defined as "the right to be let 
alone," THOMAS CooLEY, THE LAw OF ToRTS 29 (1888); "a limitation of others' access to an individual," 
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am inclined to think that attempts to find an abstract and neutral definition of 
privacy are doomed,4 at least if they purport to offer an explanation of how 
threats to abortion rights, neighborhood peeping toms, and electronic cookies 
are really all "the same thing." From an anthropological perspective-or, to use 
the currently fashionable term, a cultural studies perspective-privacy is what 
we believe it to be,5 and it is not particularly troubling for the cultural studies 
devotee (or for the common law, as Robert Post has noted)6 that the way we use 
the term "privacy" when we speak of permissible press activities differs from 
the way we use the term "privacy" when we are speaking of searches in the 
workplace. 7 
Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 428 (1980); "the control we have over 
information about ourselves," Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1968); the protection of 
that sphere involving "intimate information or activity ... which draws its meaning from an agent's 
love, liking, or care," JUDITH WAGNER DECEW, IN PuRSUIT OF PRivACY: LAW, ETHICS AND THE RISE OF 
TECHNOLOGY 55 (1997) (discussing JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION (1992)); and 
"whatever is not generally ... a legitimate concern of others." DECEw, supra, at 58. 
To some, privacy is more easily digested when chopped up into bite-sized analytic chunks; thus, 
informational privacy is distinguished from spatial privacy, decisional privacy from bodily integrity-
based privacy. To others, breaking down privacy into bite-sized chunks does not go far enough: The 
concept of privacy should, as MacKinnon memorably suggested, be "exploded." See CATHARJNE 
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 191 (1989). To others still, as Tribe observes, 
"privacy" is "a grab bag of unrelated goodies," LAURENCE H. ThmE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 
1303 (2d ed. 1988), an illusory and unnecessary concept that perhaps does not in fact exist at all, but is 
merely a word we use when we really mean something else: for instance, the rights to property and 
bodily security, see Judith Jarvis Thomson, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 26 
(1976), or the right to autonomy, see generally Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 CoLUM. L. 
REV. 1410 (1974). 
4. Some have tried, to be sure, see generally Gavison, supra note 3, but scholars from Anita 
Allen-Castellitto to Robert Post have ably critiqued Gavison's definitions. See, e.g., Anita L. Allen, 
Taking Libenies: Privacy, Private Choice, and Social Contract Theory, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 461, 463-64 
(1987); Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law 
Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 969-70 (1989). 
5. When I say "we," I mean Americans. This is not to imply, of course, that Americans are a 
homogeneous lot (we are not) or that the idea of "privacy" is uncontested in America (it is not). 
Nonetheless, it is easy to identify a cluster of core ideas associated in most people's minds with the 
word "privacy." 
6. See, e.g., Post, supra note 4, at 1008-09. 
7. This is not, of course, to suggest that the law might as well give up its project of categorizing and 
defining-after all, this is critical to legal reasoning. It is important to know (and argue about) what we 
mean when we use the term "privacy" in a given context: the tort context, say, or the constitutional 
context. We should not, however, be unduly troubled by the slipperiness of the idea of privacy. It is 
slippery because by its nature it is a creature of social norms, dialectically constructed and contested. 
Acknowledging these essential ambiguities, philosopher Judith Wagner DeCew calls privacy a "a broad 
and multifaceted cluster concept" involving a set of related but distinct claims concerning information, 
physical access, and those decisions that most express our selfhood. DECEw, supra note 3, at 61. But 
see Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REv. 737 (I 989), for a powerful critique of the 
notion that we should be free to define ourselves. This definition, of course, tells us little about the 
precise content of those claims, and why some often appear to us far more forceful than others. And, 
whether or not there is a unified abstraction called "privacy," few would disagree that many of the 
issues we often refer to as privacy issues could also be described using other terms and concepts. Most 
of the time, privacy claims also involve other claims about property rights, or free expression rights, or 
liberty. 
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Nonetheless, what I want to do in this short Review Essay is reflect a bit upon 
the choices we make when we decide to discuss certain issues under the rubric 
of privacy, rather than under some other rubric. In particular, I want to suggest 
that there are dangers in relying too much on the language of privacy, for the 
privacy rubric has the potential to obscure certain kinds of consequential harms 
that are felt differentially by people in different social and economic groups. 
Thus, I want to suggest that some of the issues we routinely think of and speak 
of as "privacy issues"-in particular, issues such as the privacy of medical 
records and electronic monitoring in the workplace-might be better described 
and analyzed as issues of power. I want to examine the reasons we hesitate to 
describe such issues as power issues, and explore some of the potential pitfalls 
,af the overbroad use of the privacy rubric. Finally, however, I want to look 
briefly at a few of the fascinating ways in which issues of privacy and issues of 
power are bound up together, and suggest that the privacy discourse might be 
rehabilitated after all-if we insist on bringing to the fore the issues of power 
that are intimately bound up with issues of privacy. 
To begin, we should ask whether Rosen offers us a satisfying and coherent 
conception of privacy. Rosen himself seems to oscillate between (and some-
times merge) two potentially different conceptions of privacy: one that has to do 
with information control, and one that has to do with notions of intimacy and 
exposure. But while most of the examples Rosen gives do involve an individu-
al's loss of control over how personal information will be disseminated, it is less 
clear that they all involve issues of intimacy and shame. 
First, consider information control. If Monica Lewinsky had had any choice 
in the matter, she presumably would not have shown her draft love letters to 
another living soul. Workers who find that their personal e-mail is routinely read 
by their employers (whether in the name of preventing sexual harassment, 
tracking productivity, or preventing "misuse" of company resources) generally 
resent it. All things being equal, they would presumably prefer to have their 
e-mail read only by the intended recipient. Web surfers are generally astounded 
to realize just how much information they leave behind in the form of those 
deceptively innocuous-sounding "cookies." And, of course, the would-be pur-
chaser of health insurance who finds her application denied because the insur-
ance company has learned, somehow or other, that she already has· signs of 
melanoma, would no doubt have given quite a lot to keep that information away 
from the insurance company. At least in this sense of privacy-as-information-
control, these four examples appear to have a good deal in common. 
But when Rosen claims that the erosion of privacy involves "intimate per-
sonal information ... being wrenched out of context and exposed to the world," 
he implies that there is more to his understanding of privacy than simple 
information control. 8 The key words here are "intimate" and "exposed," and 
Rosen alludes to a different conception of privacy, one that may in fact be more 
8. RosEN, supra note 1, at 3. 
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familiar to the layperson. Most Americans, if asked to offer an off-the-cuff, lay 
definition of "privacy," would probably find themselves referring to notions of 
intimacy, the body, sexuality, exposure, and shame. I would guess that most 
Americans first hear the word "privacy" as small children, when they ask why 
Mommy has started closing the bathroom door, or why Daddy insists that you 
have to knock before you enter his bedroom: You have to respect people's 
"privacy," the child is told. Though people come, later in life, to apply the term 
privacy to an expanding group of issues and claims, it remains, for the most 
part, rooted in the corporeal and intimate realm.9 
Thi~ alternative idea that privacy involves the intimate sphere is not necessar-
ily the "best" way to make sense of what is at stake when we speak of privacy 
(nor is it the only alternative way to conceptualize privacy), 10 but it is probably 
the conception of privacy most widely shared by Americans. Consequently, if 
we want to understand what is revealed (and what is obscured) when our 
political discourse labels certain kinds of issues as "privacy" issues, it is worth 
examining these issues in light of this common understanding of privacy. When 
our newspapers speak of privacy issues, when television shows lament threats _ 
to "our" privacy, when Rosen publishes a book on privacy, the word comes to 
us, unavoidably, with these connotations of intimacy and shame. 
Indeed, Rosen suggests, the notion of a private sphere that is rooted in the 
body and the intimate circle is by no means unique to the Anglo-American legal 
and political culture. 11 Virtually every culture has some equivalent notion of 
physical boundaries and taboos relating to domestic spaces and to sexuality, 
birth, death, and other natural functions such as excretion and eating. As Milton 
Konvitz noted, "Almost the first page of the Bible introduces us to the feeling of 
shame as a violation of privacy." 12 He refers, of course, to Adam and Eve's 
sudden awareness, after eating the forbidden fruit, of their nakedness and their 
instant dash for the fig leaves. Konvitz observes, "[M]ythically, we have been 
taught that our very knowledge of good and evil---our moral nature as men-is 
somehow, by divine ordinance, linked with a sense and a realm of privacy."13 
Similarly, when Ham sniggers over his father Noah's nakedness while Noah lies 
9. For a discussion of the relationship between conceptions of the body and the evolution of the idea 
of privacy, see generally THOMAS LAQUEUR, MAKING SEX: BODY AND GENDER FROM THE GREEKS TO FREUD 
(1990). 
I 0. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
II. See RosEN, supra note I, at 18. 
12. DECEw, supra note 3, at 11 (quoting Milton R. Konvitz, Privacy and the Law: A Philosophical 
Prelude, 31 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 272 (1966)). 
13. /d. Interestingly-and perhaps contrary to some of the arguments about "personhood"-there is 
some evidence that it is not only humans who ritualistically create spheres of privacy. DeCew briefly 
discusses animal studies suggesting that "virtually all animals seek periods of individual seclusion or 
small group intimacy," and that this urge towards privacy serves "various biological purposes, espe-
cially those of ensuring propagation of the species." See id. at 12. 
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"uncovered in his tent," God sees to it that Ham's descendants are forever 
condemned to be servants and slaves. 14 
In legal terms, privacy of this sort, if violated, leads to dignitary harms. Such 
privacy violations damage our "personality interests," and in some way or 
another cause us to experience psychic pain: fear, revulsion, humiliation, out-
rage, insult, shame, and so on. It is easy enough, then, to understand why the 
retrieval and publication of Lewinsky's draft love letters resonates as a quintes-
sential privacy violation; after all, overheated musings and fantasy communica-
tions with the President are surely rooted in the body, in sexuality, and in the 
most intimate sphere. Even the steeliest political cynic can hardly doubt that 
publication of the letters caused Monica Lewinsky the most intense feelings of 
exposure and shame. Similarly, we intuitively grasp the privacy violation that 
occurs when a member of the paparazzi-or merely a prurient neighbor-
photographs us sunbathing in the nude with a special, long-distance lens, or 
when a gay person is "outed" to his family against his will. 
But if our intuitive understanding of privacy is rooted in the corporeal, 
intimate sphere, and the pain of invaded privacy leads to dignitary harms such 
as humiliation, exposure, and shame, why is it that we also speak so readily of 
electronic cookies, workplace e-mail monitoring, and the disclosure of medical 
information to insurance companies as fundamentally "privacy violations"? 
These seem, at first glance, to be different issues entirely. If Amazon.com is 
somehow able to tell that I visited three other online bookshops before visiting 
its site, or that I am fond of gardening manuals, who cares? 15 Similarly, if my 
employer monitors my workplace e-mailing habits, 16 this would seem to have 
little to do with my body or my intimate sphere and is most unlikely to lead to 
feelings of exposure and shame on my part-though it might well lead to other 
kinds of serious negative consequences (of which more later). Even when my 
medical records somehow end up in the possession of every existing insurance 
company, and I am subsequently denied health insurance because I smoke or 
carry a gene that is likely to cause a debilitating disease, it is by no means clear 
that my privacy has been violated in the intuitive sense in which we understand 
the term. I have never met the insurance company clerk who sees my records 
(or more likely programs the computer that assesses my records and sends me 
form letters). My health is not something I ought to be embarrassed about, and 
even if I am embarrassed by my health status, it does not cause feelings of 
14. /d. at II (quoting Konvitz, supra note 12, at 272). 
15. Indeed, even if Amazon.com records that my preferred leisure reading is soft porn, it is not even 
particularly clear that this should bother me. After all, I do not know the computer operators or the 
warehouse workers at Amazon.com. In every way that matters to me, my online order of soft porn 
offers me far more privacy than does buying my porn at the little neighborhood newsstand. 
16. My former employer most certainly monitored. Until August 2000, I worked at the U.S. 
Department of State, and every morning, when I logged on to my computer (both my classified 
computer and my unclassified computer), I was greeted by a stem welcome screen reminding me that 
"this computer is the property of the U.S. Department of State .... You have no reasonable expectation 
of privacy." 
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shame or exposure when Blue Cross/Blue Shield rejects me. Frustration? Yes. 
Anxiety? Yes. But shame? Probably not. 
Rosen, citing Georg Simmel, discusses this "stranger phenomenon": We are 
apt to care little when strangers obtain information about us, even if that 
information would be embarrassing if known to our family, colleagues or 
neighbors. 17 The disapproval of a stranger does not affect our reputation; the 
warehouse employee at Amazon.com cannot see us and will likely never meet 
us. Nor will the Blue Cross/Blue Shield employee. Nor will the faceless 
bureaucrat who randomly monitors workplace e-mail. So why do we lump these 
issues together with the neighborhood peeping tom and the prurience of Ken 
Starr, or even the indignities of having to undergo a workplace investigation 
into allegations of sexual harassment? 
It could be argued, of course, that all of these situations contain at least the 
potential for shame and exposure. Perhaps the faceless bureaucrat reading my 
e-mail will come across the message in which I confess to having a crush on a 
coworker and will forward this to my boss as evidence that I am an incipient 
sexual harasser. Perhaps Blue Cross/Blue Shield will send my employer a letter 
noting that it cannot insure me because of my HIV status, the letter will 
somehow get around, and I will be ostracized by my colleagues. 
These potentialities are by no means impossible, 18 but they do seem far-
fetched, or at least sufficiently far-fetched to make it less than obvious why we 
so readily group workplace e-mail monitoring, electronic footprints, and medi-
cal confidentiality with Ken Starr and the local voyeur. After all, we faced this 
sort of danger even before the advent of new technologies: My purchase of a 
pornographic magazine at a seemingly safe, distant newsstand could have been 
witnessed by my nosy neighbor. My idle scribbles about my office crush might 
have been discovered when I accidentally left my steno-pad in the cafeteria. If 
that were to happen, it would certainly be bad luck-but we would hardly be 
inclined to declare that an invasion of privacy occurred. 
Why consider these examples? Rosen's oscillation between the notion of 
privacy as information control and privacy as intimacy may be a little inconsis-
tent, but why is this significant? 
The problem with the concept of "privacy," however defined, is that whatever 
work it does, its problematic overuse can obscure certain issues of power and 
consequential harm. Certainly, there is something that bothers us about the idea 
that our workplace e-mail is monitored, that our medical records may end up in 
the hands of insurance companies, and so on. It is just not clear to me that the 
"something" that bothers us is the same something that bothers us about the 
17. See RosEN, supra note 1, at 198 (discussing GEORG SIMMEL, THE SociOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL 404 
(Kurt H. Wolff ed. & trans., 1950)). 
18. Indeed, Rosen's book is full of cases in which similar potentialities have, in fact, occurred. See 
generally id. 
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neighborhood peeping tom. To put it differently, it is not clear that what ought 
to bother us is the same thing that does bother us about the local voyeur. 
When we think about issues such as the confidentiality of our medical records 
and workplace monitoring, what really bothers many of us, I think-or what 
certainly should bother us-may or may not have much to do with "privacy," 
conceived of in either the information control sense or the dignitary sense, but it 
has a great deal to do with power. More specifically, what should bother us are 
balances of power that are damaging or inequitable. 
Let me illustrate this by reference to two of my earlier examples: the 
disclosure of medical records and workplace monitoring. In the first instance, in 
what way have I been harmed when my medical records end up in the hands of 
insurance companies? If I am fairly lucky (that is to say, healthy), I will not be 
harmed at all. If I am a habitually unlucky person, it is possible that some 
embarrassing detail relating to, say, my treatment for heroin addiction will get 
back to my friends and neighbors, causing serious dignitary harm: My reputa-
tion will most likely suffer. But if I am only garden-variety unlucky-if, for 
instance, I smoke, or am HIV-positive, or show signs of incipient melanoma-I 
am likely to suffer a perfectly clear-cut and tangible kind of consequential harm: 
I will be denied insurance coverage, or offered coverage only at an astronomically 
high rate that I may be unable to afford. As a result, I may go into debt to afford 
decent health care, I may decide that I can only afford poor health care if I am to avoid 
going into debt, or I may be unable to afford health care at all. If it is impossible to 
purchase health care, I may, as a result, get very sick, or even die. 
Is this a privacy issue? Perhaps it is, for some of us, at least some of the time. 
It may or may not make sense to describe this example as a privacy issue, but it 
is certainly a power issue. Health insurance companies are, for the most part, 
entirely free to refuse to insure me or charge me excessive premiums, and I 
have virtually no recourse. In the United States, unlike in many European 
countries, people have no right or entitlement to affordable health care, and, as 
we know, the United States government has thus far shown little interest in or 
ability to change the system to guarantee that all have decent health care. An 
unhealthy would-be health insurance consumer has virtually no power. The 
insurance companies, in contrast, have quite a lot. 
Put this way, the "problem" here is not, most fundamentally, a privacy 
problem or a dignitary harm problem. The problem is that America lacks a 
decent health care system, and this can be devastating to those without exten-
sive private resources. This is a problem that is intimately tied to power 
relations. Consequently, the solution to this problem is not, ultimately, the 
protection of our medical records from unauthorized disclosure-that may help, 
but it is only a Band-Aid, to use a medical metaphor. The true cure is to 
guarantee affordable access to decent health care for all Americans. 
Consider a second and perhaps even more powerful example: employer 
monitoring of workplace e-mail. Here, too, the problem is not, most fundamen-
tally, that my boss is likely to find out something about me that is "private" and 
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that will cause me intense humiliation and shame if discovered. The problem is 
that my boss can fire me for a wide range of reasons, and unless I am a union 
member with a particularly good contract and effective representation, I will 
have little recourse. I may be disciplined or fired if my boss discovers my habit 
of sending sexist jokes to all my colleagues, and this might cause me some 
humiliation, to be sure. But in the typical employment-at-will context, I may be 
disciplined or fired for a wide range of other reasons, too. My boss may find my 
haircut, my clothes, or my attitude "disruptive," for instance. If my boss 
monitors my e-mails, maybe he finds the literacy level of my messages too low, 
or thinks that I type them too slowly, or send too many, or too few, or am a little 
too candid in my criticisms of the work environment or company policies. It 
does not really matter which: Chances are, the boss can fire me. 
Here too, depending on the context, it may or may not make sense to construe 
this as a privacy issue. Yet regardless of whatever else it is, it is surely a power 
issue that stems both from the deep structure of American employment law and 
from the economic and social framework of our society more broadly. It is a 
power issue, and the harm I will suffer if I am fired will not merely be a 
dignitary harm. 19 If I am fired or demoted, I am likely to suffer some tangible 
and extremely unpleasant economic harms. Depending on my personal circum-
stances, these harms may be quite literally devastating. 
Again, the "problem" here is not that my e-mail is monitored. That is only a 
symptom. The problem is that despite the erosion of at-will employer traditional 
privileges, most American workers have very little power in relation to their 
employers. Most can be fired for an astonishingly large number of reasons and 
can have an awful lot of. their rights infringed upon with impunity?0 The 
solution to this problem is not the creation of laws or policies forbidding e-mail 
monitoring by employers, although that would be helpful as a first step. The 
solution would involve a radical overhaul of employment law. 
19. Of course, there is nothing "mere" about dignitary harms. See, e.g., W.S. Brown, Ontological 
Security, Existential Anxiety and Workplace Privacy, 23 J. Bus. ETHICS 61 (2000). However, it makes 
sense analytically to distinguish them from tangible and quantifiable physical and economic harms. 
20. For instance, private employees can, in general, be fired for speech their employer disapproves 
of, with certain well-defined exceptions. See Smith v. Upson County, 859 F. Supp. 1504 (M.D. Ga. 
1994); Newman v. Legal Servs. Corp., 628 F. Supp. 535 (D.D.C. 1986) (reiterating that the First 
Amendment applies only to state action, and that in the employment-at-will context, an employer is free 
to dismiss employees for virtually any reason, including a bad reason, although narrow public policy 
exceptions exist); Korb v. Raytheon Corp., 574 N.E.2d 370 (Mass. 1991); Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom 
of Expression in the Workplace and the Problem of Discriminatory Harassment, 75 TEx. L. REv. 687, 
689 (1997) ("Particularly in the private sector, employers enjoy nearly untrammeled power to censor 
and punish the speech of their employees, subject only to a variety of limited statutory and common 
law restrictions."). See generally Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will 
World, 74 TEx. L. REv. 1655 (1996). For a critique of the way in which the distinction between the 
private and the public has traditionally been used to maintain this state of affairs, see Karl E. Klare, The 
Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1358, 1361 (1982). Klare argues that "the 
public/private distinction poses as an analytical tool in labor law, but it functions more as a form of 
political rhetoric to justify particular results." /d. at 1361-62. 
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In a recent article about workplace harassment, I argued that Title VII's 
discrimination paradigm provided an incomplete understanding of the harms of 
workplace harassment because it fails to account for the aspect of dignitary 
harm.Z 1 I noted that not all workplace harassment is discriminatory either in 
intent or in impact under the terms of Title VII, even if it causes intense 
dignitary harms.Z2 Conversely, some blatantly discriminatory workplace actions 
(differential hiring, training, or promotions, for instance) may have little or no 
obvious dignitary impact upon victims. To be sure, much workplace harassment 
is both discriminatory in intent and produces dignitary harms. I suggested, as a 
result, that we might imagine two circles, overlapping but distinct: one labeled 
"dignitary harms" and one labeled "discriminatory actions." Some workplace 
harassment would fit into only one circle; some would fit into the area of 
overlap.Z3 
We might wish to imagine a similar set of circles when we consider the many 
issues habitually thought of under the privacy rubric. One circle might be 
labeled "privacy violations causing dignitary harms." True, this is only one 
aspect of what we call privacy, but it is a major aspect and worth separating out. 
Another circle might be labeled "power issues."24 (I am not entirely happy with 
this terminology, which seems imprecise, but I cannot at the moment come up 
with a better terminology. But more on this later). 
If we imagine these overlapping circles, we can be much clearer about where 
things are on the privacy-power continuum. Thus, if my neighbor peeps through 
my bedroom window, it seems fairly easy to place this sort of intrusion in the 
"privacy violations causing dignitary harms" circle. When Ken Starr snatched 
Monica's computer, it caused her great dignitary harm-but it was also a power 
play on the part of the independent counsel's office and the Republican right. 
This would then go into the area of overlap between the circles. If my 
prospective insurer discovers that I am HIV-positive, this too might well fit into 
the area of overlap-but if my insurer merely discovers that I smoke, perhaps it 
should fit only into the "power issues" circle. If my e-mail is monitored by my 
boss, and I am subsequently fired for sending too many non-work-related 
e-mails, or for criticizing workplace policies, this too might be seen as fitting 
most comfortably in the "power issues" circle. 
I said early in this Review Essay that I doubted the possibility of arriving at 
an abstract and neutral definition of privacy, and for my purposes, it is neither 
here nor there that we use the word "privacy" in a range of different ways, not 
all of which are fully consistent. But I am concerned about our collective 
21. See Rosa Ehrenreich, Dignity and Discrimination: Toward a Pluralistic Understanding of 
Workplace Harassment, 88 GEo. L.J. l (1999). 
22. Consider a workplace in which one worker is mocked for her accent or obesity in a way that is 
unconnected to sex, race, and so on. 
23. See Ehrenreich, supra note 21, at 63. 
24. Because discrimination is inevitably about power, this maps more or less onto the "dignity" and 
"discrimination" circles. 
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readiness to lose sight of the issue of power and subsume it wholly into the 
murky and contested notion of privacy?5 It seems to me that distinguishing 
between the two circles I just described-while recognizing that they can 
overlap substantially-is important, both analytically and practically. 
Analytically, it helps to know what it is we are talking about when we speak 
of privacy-leaving aside the question of whether it matters that we end up 
talking about what Nadine Strossen called "the various separate facets of ... di-
verse rights ... that sometimes seem quite disparate."26 Whatever words we 
use, we need to know just what is at stake, and a concept as capacious and 
flexible as "privacy" can obscure as much as it reveals. In particular, the 
language of privacy may blind us to the fact that the exposure of certain kinds 
of information about ourselves-intimate or not--can cause distinct consequen-
tial harms that have a differential impact upon people who are already vulner-
able. 
Practically, it also makes a tremendous difference, because if we fail to 
distinguish between these separate but overlapping categories, we are likely to 
pour our energies into the wrong policy initiatives?7 We are likely, for instance, 
to become fixated on protecting the confidentiality of medical records and to 
forget all about the importance of ensuring access to health care for all Ameri-
cans. Or we will focus on preventing workplace e-mail monitoring-but forget 
that this leaves employees as vulnerable as ever to being fired or having 
important speech and associational rights infringed. Conversely, were we, as a 
society, to find a way to guarantee decent health care for all or to increase 
worker rights (or create a social safety net generous enough that being fired 
would be less catastrophic), we might well discover that the "privacy" issues 
Rosen identifies with regard to medical records and workplace monitoring 
would simply dissolve, or at any rate lose much of their salience. 
But if these power issues are so important, why are they so rarely discussed? 
Why is it that we generally discuss these issues in terms of privacy? I think 
there are at least three reasons. 
The first reason may be connected to something I mentioned a moment ago, 
when I noted that I was not entirely happy with the terminology I was using; to 
speak of "power" or "power issues" strikes me as worryingly imprecise. But 
perhaps this is due to something more than my own failure of imagination-
perhaps my own failure to devise a more precise terminology reflects a more 
general difficulty many of us have. In this postideological age, it seems to me 
that we no longer have an adequate vocabulary for talking about issues of 
25. Cf Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1, 9 (1992) 
(noting that "[u]se of the same term, such as privacy, in different contexts often hides the significance 
of the nonnative-descriptive dimensions and is likely to cause confusion"). 
26. Hunter, Strossen & Rubenfeld, supra note 3, at 195. 
27. Cf Gavison, supra note 25, at 43 (noting that "the ambiguity of terms may lead to errors in 
practical reasoning"). 
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power. The Marxist discourse strikes most of us as discredited, or, at best, 
quaint, but we have yet to come up with a new language. 
As a result, we cannot speak truth to power; we can hardly even bring 
ourselves to acknowledge that there is something called power, and that some 
people have a lot of it, while others have little or none of it.28 My own 
understanding of what the word "power" means owes much more to Weber than 
to Foucault (Weber famously defined power as "the probability that one actor 
within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite 
resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests").Z9 But in the 
academic discourse today, speaking about power generally leads your listeners 
to conclude that you are a turgid and feckless devotee of Foucault (in other 
words, a "Crit," and the sort of person with whom mainstream scholars have 
lost patience), or, perhaps even worse, one of those unpleasantly literal-minded 
clinical advocacy types, forever going on about poverty and the like-as if all 
scholarship should be judged by whether it feeds the hungry! In our broader 
political discourse, an insistence on using the word "power" (in contexts other 
than a discussion of pro-wrestling or turbo engines) marks one as an old-
fashioned populist type who just cannot seem to move on. 
To speak of "power" in modern America is outre, and somewhat distasteful; it 
reminds us of inequalities most would much rather forget. All Americans are 
supposed to be equal.30 To speak of "privacy," however, seems safely all-
American. After all, Americans can all agree that privacy is a good thing. 
This, then, is the second reason we find it easier to speak of issues like 
workplace monitoring under the rubric of privacy rather than power. Power is 
hard to talk about, but privacy is easy to talk about. At any rate, we imagine that 
it is easy to talk about, because virtually all Americans think they know what it 
is. The notion of privacy has great resonance for us, rooted as it is in the 
corporeal, intimate realm. When we imagine certain kinds of privacy violations 
(having our unsent love letters printed for all to see, for instance), we experi-
ence strong and visceral feelings of exposure, shame, and outrage. As I argued 
earlier, such dignitary violations lie at the core of our intuitive understanding of 
privacy. We can teach ourselves to think of other things as privacy violations, 
28. But cf MICHEL FoucAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PuNISH: THE BIRTH OF PRISON (Alan Sheridan trans., 
1977) (critiquing the idea that power is something that individuals or institutions can meaningfully be 
said to "possess" or "lack"). 
29. See MAX WEBER, The Fundamental Concepts of Sociology, in THE THEORY OF SociAL AND 
EcoNOMIC ORGANIZATION 157 (Talcott Parsons ed., A.M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans., 1947). 
30. Interestingly, the European approach to privacy issues makes extensive use of the vocabulary of 
"dignity," but in many ways the European conception of privacy is linked to an idea of dignity that is 
rooted in traditions of social inequality (and is thus deeply linked to issues of unequal power). As Jim 
Whitman puts it, the legacy of social hierarchy in Europe has led Europeans to use ideas of dignity and 
civility as "leveling up" mechanisms: Everyone demands the same measures of civility and respect 
once accorded only to the elite. In America, Whitman argues, we lack the same history of class 
hierarchy, and tend to "level down" instead. James Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility and Respect: Three 
Societies, 109 YALE L.J. 1279, 1387 (2000). 
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too (restrictions on abortion, or electronic footprints, for instance), and we can 
convince ourselves that doing so is justified and helpful. When we decide to 
label those things "privacy violations," some of the powerful connotations of 
the word "privacy" may make us care more-or care differently-about these 
issues than we otherwise would. 
This has practical consequences for those interested in policy reform, too: It 
is a lot easier to be sanguine about our ability to achieve better privacy 
protections than it is to be sanguine about our ability to readjust the balance of 
power between insurers and the uninsured, or employees and workers. It is not 
hard at all to imagine members of Congress reading Rosen's lucid and compel-
ling book and deciding to introduce legislation tightening protections of medical 
records or regulating some kinds of workplace monitoring. But it is hard to 
imagine members of Congress getting together and deciding that this time they 
are really going to overhaul the health care system or the employment law 
system. 
The third reason we treat these issues as privacy issues rather than power 
issues is more complicated. I have argued for the importance of analytically 
distinguishing issues of privacy and issues of power. Indeed, I have suggested at 
points in this Review Essay that "privacy" and "power" lie at opposite ends of a 
continuum, and I have also drawn upon the image of two overlapping but 
conceptually distinct circles, one labeled "privacy violations causing dignitary 
harms" and the other labeled "power issues." I offered these two spatial images 
to help us distinguish between two concepts that are often entirely conftated, 
and I hope the images have helped to disaggregate them. But useful as these 
images may be, they are also themselves misleading because they are both static 
images; they fail to acknowledge that "power" and "privacy" not only overlap, 
but construct one another. 
Perhaps, then, it is hard for our political discourse to distinguish fully 
between privacy and power in part because privacy and power are intimately 
bound up with each other. In fact, it would probably not be an exaggeration to 
say that without privacy, power could not sustain itself; and without power, 
privacy could not exist. As I argue in the remainder of this Review Essay, the 
realm of the "private" is always constructed in relation to social power: Power 
constructs privacy and, to maintain itself, power also destroys privacy. Privacy, 
in tum, both constructs power and challenges it?' 
This issue is too large and complex to be dealt with adequately in so short an 
essay, but too important to ignore. I will try, then, to give at least a brief sketch 
of some of the ways in which privacy and power are interconnected. 
While every human society has a concept of "the private," the specific 
contents of that concept vary greatly. Historically, things Americans now see as 
critical aspects of privacy and the private realm are associated with the rise of 
31. It is no coincidence, of course, that the Biblical Ham is punished for gazing upon Noah's 
nakedness by being condemned, with all his descendants, to live in servitude. Genesis 9:18-29. 
2001] PRIVACY AND POWER 2059 
the urban bourgeoisie. The private realm was defined in opposition to the public 
realm, and this emerging conception of the private sphere was used to justify 
bourgeois resistance to monarchical and feudal power. 32 Meanwhile, in the 
domestic realm, the emerging bourgeoisie differentiated themselves from ser-
vants and apprentices by retreating to "private" bedrooms and bathrooms, and 
by developing more and more complex rituals relating to clothing, etiquette, and 
so on?3 No longer was sleeping in the same room with servants and animals 
acceptable for the master and mistress of the house; the new bourgeois elite 
carved out private areas as a spatial symbol of their greater social and economic 
power.34 
In America, issues of privacy are linked to issues of power particularly along 
the axes of gender, race, and class?5 Robert Post reminds us that in 1890 E.L. 
Godkin36 called privacy "one of the luxuries of civilization ... unknown in 
primitive or barbarous societies"-and the example Godkin offers is that of 
"loafers" in a Wild West mining town, who, "in their own rude way," are 
insulted by a traveler's insistence on performing his toilet out of their sight.37 
Warren and Brandeis were famously outraged when the press publicized a 
"private" and upper-class affair to the masses and promptly began to insist on 
the tort of invasion of privacy. Ernest Goffman observed that privacy's "rules of 
deference and demeanor" serve to affirm the social order, and a generation of 
feminist scholars has demonstrated the ways in which nineteenth-century middle-
class conceptions of the private-public divide operated to exclude women from 
powerful public roles,38 and the ways in which the idea of the "private" also 
32. See generally, e.g., CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CoNTRACT (1988). 
33. Peter Brooks notes that this was reflected in almost all aspects of domestic life: 
Privacy ... belongs to a conception of upper- and middle-class leisure and family life that 
emerged,. first in England, and then in France, starting sometime in the seventeenth century, 
and developed rapidly in the eighteenth century. The notion of privacy is tied to the rise of the 
modem city .... [P]rivacy is reflected, for instance, in domestic architecture, in the shift from 
the communal living, eating, and sleeping spaces of the medieval house to the well-
demarcated private apartments, boudoirs, "closets," and alcoves of eighteenth century upper-
and middle-class housing. 
PETER BROOKS, BODY WORK: OBJECTS OF DESIRE IN MODERN NARRATIVE 28 (1993); see also FERNAND 
BRAUDEL, CAPITALISM AND MATERIAL LIFE, 1400-1800, at 224 (1973) (discussing privacy as "an 
eighteenth century innovation"). See generally A HisTORY OF PRNATE LIFE (Phillip Aries & George 
Duby eds., 1986). 
34. See, e.g., PETER GAY, THE EDUCATION OF THE SENSES 403 (1984) (discussing the rise of the idea of 
privacy among affluent middle-class Victorians: "No other class at any other time was more strenu-
ously, more anxiously devoted to the appearances, to the family, and to privacy, no other class has ever 
built fortifications for the self quite so high."). 
35. See, e.g., Y.K. Chan, Privacy in the Family: Its Hierarchical and Asymmetric Nature, 31 J. CoMP. 
FAM. STUD. 1 (2000) (discussing domestic privacy in Chinese culture). 
36. Godkin, Post notes, was approvingly cited by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brandeis. Post, 
supra note 4, at 976. 
37. /d. 
38. For a summary and discussion of some common feminist critiques of the public-private 
distinction, see generally Gavison, supra note 25. 
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justified the failure of public officials to intervene to protect women from domestic 
violence?9 Similarly, Jed Rubenfeld has el<X}uently reminded us that constitutional 
privacy rights can only be understood and justified by reference to state strivings 
toward totalitarian power.40 On the transnational level, the idea of "sovereignty" has 
been forcefully attacked as the privacy of states to do as they wish to their citizens 
without interference from other states. (If sovereignty is the cloak of privacy claimed 
by powerful but abusive states, "human rights" is the counterclaim, an assertion, 
among other things, of individual privacy-in the sense of irreducible dignity, person-
hood, autonomy-as a challenge to the state's totalizing ambitionsf1 
In general, those who have power have the luxury of defining what is and 
what is not private, and the luxury of controlling their own privacy while 
denying that of others.42 It is no accident that absolute power demands absolute 
privacy for itself and zero privacy for others, for this is a crucial part of how 
those with power maintain their power and destroy that of others. More 
concretely, consider the totalitarian regime that specializes in late-night raids on 
the homes of its citizens and t~Jrning friends and lovers into informants; 
consider the concentration camp guards who force prisoners to defecate in front 
of them, while punishing those prisoners who look guards directly in the eye.43 
These examples may seem extreme, but students of crime and punishment 
recognize that even the most "civilized" and human rights-oriented societies use 
the denial of privacy as a mechanism of social control.44 
While the content of the "private" varies from culture to culture-and can 
shift radically within a culture45 -having our privacy respected, in certain 
minimal and culturally constituted ways, is indeed critical to our personhood. 
39. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 
YALE L.J. 2117,2150 (1996). 
40. See generally Rubenfeld, supra note 7. Rubenfeld restricts his argument to privacy in the 
constitutional sense. In the private sphere too, however, privacy should be understood as intimately 
bound up with aspirations towards totalizing power. 
41. It is worth noting, in this regard, that the distinction between "national" and "international" in 
international law maps almost exactly onto the domestic distinction between the private and the public. 
With the rise of a transnational human rights discourse, the legitimacy of the national-international 
distinction is now under attack as never before, and increasing globalization renders the distinction still 
harder to maintain. 
42. See, e.g., Louise Marie Roth, The Right to Power Is Political: Power, the Boundary Between 
Public and Private, and Sexual Harassment, 24 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 45, 68 (1999) ("The more 
powerful are always more able to define and defend the boundary between public and private in their 
lives."). 
43. See generally WoLFGANG SoFSKY, THE ORDER OF ThRROR: THE CoNCENTRATION CAMP (William 
Templer trans., 1997). 
44. See, e.g., FoucAULT, supra note 28, at 196-201. See generally JoNATHAN SIMON, PooR DISCIPLINE: 
PAROLE AND THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF THE UNDERCLASS, 1890-1990 (1993); Teresa A. Miller, Sex and 
Surveillance: Gender, Privacy, and the Sexualization of Power in Prison, 10 GEo. MASON U. CIV. RTs. 
L.J. 291 (2000) (discussing how guards, officials, or other prisoners often exploit a prisoner's sexuality 
in order to assert control over that prisoner). 
45. Indeed, as Anita Allen-Castellitto has pointed out, today many Americans appear to revel in 
casting off their privacy; Allen-Castellitto cites tell-all television talk shows and the rise of web cams. 
As Allen-Castellitto notes, if we believe that certain forms of privacy are necessary to a liberal society, 
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This is true not merely from a philosophical point of view. There is evidence 
that it is also true from a biological point of view. 46 MacKinnon spoke of the 
need for feminists to "explode the private," alluding to the ways in which the 
construction of the "private" sphere may operate to render invisible the abuses 
of the powerful (in particular, violence against women).47 MacKinnon's analy-
sis was compelling-but, as many feminists and human rights advocates have 
argued since, she gave short shrift to the ways in which the powerful are 
themselves eager to "explode the private" when doing so offers a convenient 
way to humiliate and control. 
If we accept this idea that privacy and power are intimately bound up, it may 
help explain why we habitually speak of things such as workplace monitoring 
and the disclosure of medical records in terms of privacy, rather than in terms of 
power. On some level, perhaps we do this because we sense that to speak of 
privacy is already to speak of power; it is addressing issues of power through 
the back door. When an employer monitors his workers' e-mail, it is, among 
other things, a way of saying: "There is nothing that is yours. All that you think 
is yours is really mine."48 Such workplace e-mail monitoring is, of course, on a 
continuum that also includes surveillance cameras in the workers' lounge or 
changing room, and urine samples delivered on demand as part of antidrug 
policies. Further back, in the darkest recesses of our collective awareness, 
workplace e-mail monitoring is also on a continuum with the company town's 
total control, with the chain gang, the gulag, and the slave.49 
In practice, the distance between those intrusions and acts that implicate the 
corporeal, intimate realm and those that do not do so in any obvious way may 
not be far at all. The employer who monitors computer use in the name of 
productivity or antiharassment policies is likely also to demand the frequent 
this raises troubling questions about whether (and when, and how) the state should compel these forms. 
See generally Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 723 (1999). 
46. DeCew mentions studies suggesting that when animals (especially primates) are denied spatial 
or physical privacy, they become depressed and dysfunctional. DECEw, supra note 3, at 12. 
47. See MAcKINNON, supra note 3, at 168-69. 
48. In the employment-at-will setting, this is implicit in basic understandings of the employer-
employee relationship: The employee "sells" his body and labor to the employer, albeit for a specified 
period of time. The employee becomes, in a sense, the "property" of the employer, just as the 
workplace itself and the equipment with which the employee works are the property of the employer. If, 
as some have suggested, privacy rights are a species of property rights, see supra notes 4-8 and 
accompanying text, the worker in the employment-at-will setting has contracted away his privacy 
(property) rights at the workplace door. See Roth, supra note 42, at 57 ("[S]urveillance is applied most 
vigorously to those with the least ability to define the boundaries between their private and public 
lives."). 
49. See KEVIN BALES, DISPOSABLE PEOPLE: THE NEW SLAVERY IN THE GLOBAL EcONOMY 9 (2000) 
("Slaves are often forced to sleep next to their looms or brick kilns; some are even chained to their 
work tables. All their waking hours may be turned into working hours."). Similarly, American workers 
complain of being symbolically chained to their desks and jobs, as new technologies blur the 
boundaries between "work" and "nonwork." Physical chains cannot be equated with metaphoric chains, 
but perhaps the distance between the slave and the average American worker is not quite as vast as one 
likes to assume. 
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production of urine samples. And from using these tactics in pursuit of productiv-
ity or a harassment-free or drug-free workplace, it is only a small and impercep-
tible step to using these tactics as a naked reminder of power. In one workplace 
I know of, for instance, workers active in efforts to form a union began to find 
themselves hauled in to provide urine samples nearly every day-allegedly 
randomly. The message was not lost on them. 5° 
Given this, perhaps we should not, after all, be so critical of Rosen's tendency 
to speak of such issues under the privacy rubric.51 Perhaps speaking of these 
issues as privacy issues is, in some sense, a "subaltern discourse," as the 
cultural critics would have it, a way of indirectly problematizing and destabiliz-
ing power. To speak of privacy can be, in some contexts, to challenge the 
legitimacy of power and assert strong counterclaims about human dignity. By 
appealing to the resonant language of privacy, we evoke concepts of shame and 
humiliation and exposure, even when they are not immediately or obviously 
involved; we remind ourselves of our vulnerability, even when we consider 
ourselves secure, and we-perhaps--create a way for the powerless and the 
powerful alike to rally around an issue. Employers may be loathe to give up 
power over employees, and insurers loathe to increase consumer power-but 
calls for "privacy" resonate with us all. 
I have come full circle. My goal is not to argue that it is always wrong to speak of 
such issues as privacy issues, and always right to speak of them as power issues. 
Analytically and strategically, there are times when it may be useful to use one 
term, and times when it may be useful to use the other, or to use both. 52 
But while it may not always matter which term we use, I believe that it is 
important for us to know what it is that we mean when we use each term, to 
know just what is at stake, and for whom-and for us squarely to confront the 
issues of power that lie at the heart of privacy. 
50. Interview with Gary Stevenson, former Director of Organizing for the Teamsters, in Washington, 
D.C. (Sept. 30, 2000). 
51. In a recent article, Lawrence Rothstein argues that "dignity" would be a better framework for 
addressing workplace e-mail monitoring than "privacy." He uses "dignity" in its robust European sense, 
and draws explicitly upon French, Italian, and European Union approaches to workplace monitoring. 
Lawrence E. Rothstein, Privacy or Dignity?: Electronic Monitoring in the Workplace, 19 N.Y.L. ScH. 
J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 379, 383-98 (2000). To the extent that the European legal tradition conceives of 
dignity as a notion necessary precisely to overcome historical power and status inequalities, I very 
much agree with Rothstein. Here too, however, I would note that our American conception of "privacy" 
may operate to pull issues of power in through the back door. After all, privacy is, in the tort sense, 
traditionally conceived as an issue of dignitary harms. 
52. Cf Post, supra note 4, at 971. Speaking of common-law privacy conceptions, Post notes that the 
common law "is primarily interested in maintaining the forms of respect ... and relatively indifferent to 
whether particular forms of respect should be denominated as 'privacy.' " /d. 
